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Abstract
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) were in a jurisdictional tug-of-war until
March 2013, when the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a much anticipated
decision in Hunter v. FERC. This Article discusses the Hunter case, which offered
some clarity as to the jurisdictional boundaries of the CFTC and FERC with regard
to certain types of futures contracts. Historically, the CFTC has been authorized
by the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) to prevent and regulate fraud and
manipulation in the futures market. On the other hand, FERC is an independent
agency charged with the task of regulating interstate transmission of electricity
and natural gas. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EP Act”) expanded FERC’s
authority to prevent and prohibit manipulation in the purchase or sale of natural
gas or electricity. However, as this Article mentions, it was clear to many that
there would be some turf wars between the CFTC and FERC due to their
overlapping jurisdiction. This Article examines the Hunter case and the court’s
decision that the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the natural gas futures
market pursuant to the CEA.
I. Introduction
After eight years of jurisdictional tussling between the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) over energy market manipulations—much to the confusion and chagrin
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of market participants—in March 2013, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued
a highly anticipated decision in Hunter v. FERC. 1 The decision has already
sparked widespread commentary, 2 with many applauding—and others decrying—
the court’s decision.
This Article examines the CFTC’s and FERC’s respective historical
jurisdictions over manipulative conduct and explores whether the court’s decision
in Hunter is likely to clarify or further confuse market participants, as well as
whether the court’s decision might prompt meaningful Congressional
intervention.
Ultimately, with respect to the nature of transactions addressed by the
decision—the trading of futures contracts in an attempt to manipulate swaps
positions—the D.C. Circuit’s decision offers a measure of clarity with respect to
the jurisdictional boundaries of the CFTC and FERC. Beyond such transactions,
however, the Hunter decision raises more questions than it answers—questions
that likely will need to be resolved by Congress.
II. The Genesis of Hunter v. FERC
When Brian Hunter became a trader at Amaranth Advisors, LLP
(“Amaranth”) and began trading in the futures market, he likely never imagined
how three months of trading in the spring of 2006 would pit him for almost ten
years against two powerful federal agencies—the FERC and CFTC. Both he and
Amaranth would become embroiled in a power struggle with the FERC and the
CFTC that would take Hunter all the way to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
At Amaranth, Hunter traded in natural gas futures contracts, which have
a “settlement price.” This price is determined by the volume-weighted average
price of trades during the “settlement period.” The settlement price can have an
impact on the price of natural gas as a commodity. The relationship between
trading and prices is the relationship Hunter allegedly sought to exploit. Hunter
allegedly devised a plan to “short” the price of natural gas. He sold a large number
of natural gas futures contracts, amounting to 15%-19% of the entire market, in
the final thirty minutes of trading. Due to the timing and volume of his trades, the
trades drove down the settlement price of the natural gas futures contract. Despite
losing money on his natural gas futures position, however, Hunter could reap
benefits in his opposing short natural gas swaps position.
Hunter’s trading strategy caught the attention of the CFTC and the FERC.
On successive days in July 2007, the FERC and the CFTC filed enforcement
actions against Amaranth, Hunter, and another trader, Mathew Donohoe. 3
Importantly, both the FERC and the CFTC claimed jurisdiction over this action
as a result of each agency’s statutory anti-manipulation authority.

1.
2.

Hunter v. FERC, 11-1477, 2013 WL 1003666 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 2013).
See e.g., Kate Winston, Esther Whieldon, Clark “Disappointed” in Hunter Decision, Eyes Reliability,
Infrastructure Improvements, INSIDE FERC, Mar. 25, 2013, available at Platts.com (click “Products and
Services;” then follow “Newsletters and Reports” hyperlink; then follow Inside FERC hyperlink); Keith
Goldberg, FERC’s Turf War Over Futures Contracts May Hit Ratepayers, LAW360 (Mar. 20, 2013), available
at http://www.law360.com/appellate/articles/425715.
3. See Amaranth Advisors L.L.C. et al, 120 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,085 (July 26, 2007); CFTC v. Amaranth
Advisors, L.L.C., et al, No. ’07 CIV 6683 (S.D.N.Y).
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The CFTC’s and FERC’s actions against Hunter are an example of the
jurisdictional turf war that has been brewing between the FERC and the CFTC
since Congress expanded the FERC’s enforcement authority in 2005 to include,
among other things, a prohibition against market manipulation. The FERC’s
enforcement action against Hunter that culminated in a recent D.C. Circuit
decision has shed significant light on the jurisdictional boundaries for the two
agencies, but a number of questions still remain unresolved.
III. Overview of the CFTC’s and FERC’s Jurisdiction
and Anti-Manipulation Authority
A. The CFTC’s Jurisdiction and Anti-Manipulation Authority

1. CFTC Jurisdiction
When Congress created the CFTC in 1974, it conferred upon the CFTC
“exclusive jurisdiction” in Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) § 2(a)(1)(A) 4 over
commodity futures and options thereon, “which means that these instruments
cannot be regulated by any other federal or state agency (except in certain limited
circumstances where the CEA explicitly contemplates shared authority between
the CFTC and another agency).” 5 In one of the most important sections in the CEA,
Section 2(a)(1)(A) provides that:
The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . with respect to accounts,
agreements . . . and transactions involving swaps or contracts of sale of a
commodity for future delivery . . . traded or executed on a contract market . . . or a
swap execution facility . . . or any other board of trade, exchange, or market. 6

Importantly, CEA § 2(a)(1)(A) further states that, “except as hereinabove
provided,” nothing in the CEA supersedes or limits the jurisdiction of any other
regulatory authority or restricts other authorities from carrying out their duties. 7
The statutory language thus essentially establishes three precepts with
respect to the scope of the CFTC’s jurisdiction: (i) the CFTC’s jurisdiction “with
respect to” all “accounts, agreements . . . and transactions” “involving” futures and
swaps traded on any market or facility is “exclusive;” (ii) the exceptions to the
CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction as set forth in the provision itself; and (iii) except for
those areas expressly ceded to the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction, the notion that
other federal agencies retain their authority.

4. “The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . with respect to accounts, agreements, . . . and
transactions involving swaps or contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery . . . traded or executed on
a contract market designated pursuant to section 7 of this title or a swap execution facility pursuant to section
7b–3 of this title or any other board of trade, exchange, or market, and transactions subject to regulation by
the Commission pursuant to section 23 of this title.” 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (1936).
5 . REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES
MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 30 (1999).
6. 7 USC § 2(a)(1)(A) (1936).
7. “Except as hereinabove provided, nothing contained in this section shall (I) supersede or limit the
jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities and Exchange Commission or other regulatory authorities
under the laws of the United States or any State, or (II) restrict the Securities and Exchange Commission and
such authorities from carrying out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with such laws.” Id.
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The purpose of the exclusive jurisdiction provision “was to separate the
functions of the new CFTC from those of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) and other regulators.” 8 The exclusive jurisdiction provision was
incorporated as a key aspect of the 1974 amendments to the CEA in order to avoid
subjecting market participants “to conflicting agency rulings.” 9 In ceding exclusive
jurisdiction to the CFTC, Congress sought to “create one federal agency with the
expertise to regulate the commodities industry.” 10
For many years, courts had been in accord with Congress with respect to
the legislative purpose of the CEA’s exclusivity provision. 11 For example, in 1974,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Curran stated that, “[t]he purpose of the exclusivejurisdiction provision in the bill passed by the House was to separate the functions
of the Commission from those of the Securities and Exchange Commission and
other regulatory agencies.” 12

2. CFTC Anti-Manipulation Authority
By any account, a fundamental—if not the fundamental—purpose of the
CEA is to prevent manipulations in the futures markets. To accomplish this
objective, the CEA not only contains a provision that makes manipulation a felony,
but vests significant authority in the CFTC and the exchanges to prevent and
address market manipulations.
The prohibitions against manipulation of prices are contained in CEA
Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2). 13 CEA Sections 6(c) and 6(d) authorize the CFTC
to issue a complaint if it “has reason to believe that any person . . . is manipulating
or attempting to manipulate or has manipulated or attempted to manipulate the
market price of any commodity, in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on
or subject to the rules of any registered entity.” 14 CEA Section 9(a)(2) makes it
unlawful for “[a]ny person to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of any
commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules

8.
9.
10.

Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 314 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1980).
120 CONG. REC. S 16,127, 16128 (daily ed. Sep. 9, 1974) (statement of Chairman Herman Talmadge).
Thomas A. Russo & Edwin L. Lyon, The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 57, 90 (1977).
11. See e.g., State v. Monex Int’l, Ltd., 527 S.W.2d 804, Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 71234 (Tex. Civ. App.
Eastland 1975), writ refused, (Dec. 17, 1975) (disallowing action by Texas to enjoin Monex from selling
leverage contracts which had not been registered under the state securities laws on ground that newly
established CFTC “now has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate [Monex’s] margin account sales”); Clayton
Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc. v. Mouer, 531 S.W.2d 805, Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 71273 (D. Tex. Dec. 17,
1975) (dismissing as moot, state suit against brokerage company dealing in London commodity options on
ground that CFTC’s jurisdiction to regulate such options was exclusive); Int’l Trading Ltd. v. Bell, [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20,495 at 21,996 (D. Ark. Oct 3, 1977) (holding that “[w]here
. . . Congress has made it clear that authority conferred by it is exclusive in a given area, the states cannot
exercise concomitant or supplementary regulatory authority over the identical activity”).
12. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 384 (1982); see also Bibbo v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 560 (6th Cir. Ohio 1998); Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 673, 675
(11th Cir. Fla. 1988).
13. 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, and 13(a)(2) (1936).
14. 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b (1936).
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of any contract market, or to corner or attempt to corner any such commodity.” 15
Together, CEA Sections 6(c), 6(d), and 9(a)(2) prohibit both manipulation and
attempted manipulation. As mentioned above, the CEA does not define the term
“manipulation,” and courts have grappled with its seemingly amorphous
application.
The Dodd-Frank Act expanded the authority of the CFTC to prohibit
fraudulent and manipulative behavior. In particular, the law amends CEA Section
6(c)(1) to prohibit the use of any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of the Commission’s proposed rules. Further, the law amends
CEA Section 6(c)(3) to make it unlawful to manipulate or attempt to manipulate
the price of any swap or commodity.
Shortly after passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC adopted rules
implementing its new anti-manipulation authority. The new prohibition of fraudbased manipulation in Rule 180.1 prohibits deceptive or manipulative practices
(1) by any person (2) acting intentionally or recklessly (3) in connection with (4)
any swap, cash commodity contract or futures contract subject to the rules of a
designated contract market or swap execution facility. Rule 180.2 codifies the
CFTC’s long-standing authority to prohibit manipulation and attempted
manipulation in the absence of fraud. In applying the rule, the CFTC intends to
be guided by the traditional four-part test for price manipulation that has
developed in case law arising under CEA Sections 6(c) and 9(a)(2), which generally
requires that (1) the accused had the ability to influence market prices; (2) the
accused specifically intended to create or affect a price or price trend that does not
reflect legitimate forces of supply and demand; (3) artificial prices existed; and (4)
the accused caused the artificial prices. 16
Until 2005, it was generally presumed that the CFTC had the sole
anti-manipulation enforcement authority with respect to “any commodity in
interstate commerce.” 17 After the adoption of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and
the Congressional ceding of certain anti-manipulation enforcement power to
FERC, however, the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction has been questioned and
debated.
B. FERC’s Jurisdiction and Anti-Manipulation Authority

1. FERC Jurisdiction
The FERC is an independent agency under the Department of Energy
empowered with the authority to regulate the interstate transmission of electricity
and natural gas in the United States. Historically, the FERC has regulated the
wholesale markets for natural gas and electricity primarily as a rate making
15. 7 USC § 13(a)(2) (1936); see CFTC v. Reed, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1198 (D. Colo. 2007) (defense
asserting that section 13(a)(2) is overbroad because the phrase “knowingly” modifies the words “deliver” and
“inaccurate” but does not modify the words “false” and “misleading;” the court rejected the defendant’s
argument, agreeing with the CFTC that the “statute’s prohibition against the knowing dissemination of
knowingly false or misleading information into interstate commerce is not overbroad because it does not
criminalize otherwise innocent conduct”).
16. 76 Fed. Reg. 41407, citing In re IN Farm Bureau Cooperative Ass’n., Inc., [1982–84 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796, 182 WL 30249 (Dec. 17, 1982), citing Volkart Bros., Inc. v. Freeman, 311
F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
17. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (1936).
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authority with limited enforcement power. Prior to 2005, its enforcement
authority extended only to regulated entities, such as electric utilities, oil and
natural gas pipelines, natural gas distributors, and certain financial service
companies registered as power marketers with the FERC.

2. FERC Anti-Manipulation Authority
Originally, the FERC had limited, if any, anti-manipulation authority.
However, in response to suspicions of unchecked manipulation in the energy
markets in the early 2000s, FERC called for the same anti-manipulation
enforcement tools as other federal regulators. Indeed, in 2002, Congress tasked
the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) with evaluating the FERC’s efforts to
develop an effective regulatory and oversight approach for competitive natural gas
and electricity markets. The GAO found that FERC did not have an effective
regime for monitoring competitive markets and that it was trapped by antiquated
legal authorities designed for regulated monopolies. 18 The GAO thus
recommended that Congress review and revise FERC’s legal authority in the
context of competitive market structures, including providing FERC with the
appropriate range of authority to assess penalties against market participants
that engage in anticompetitive behavior or manipulation.
During the same time, Joseph T. Kelliher, then FERC chairman, began
advocating for legislation that would grant the FERC with significant additional
enforcement power. According to Kelliher:
In my view, [the FERC] lacks the necessary tools to address these dramatic
industry changes, including the threat of market manipulation. A comparison of
the Federal Power Act with other federal economic regulatory laws makes that
plain. Securities and commodities laws include express prohibitions of market
manipulation. This is lacking in the Federal Power Act. Securities and
commodities laws also provide for tough and effective penalties for both attempts
to manipulate markets and manipulation itself. There is no valid public policy
reason why [the FERC] should not have the same enforcement tools as other
federal economic regulatory agencies. A comparison of the Federal Power Act with
other federal economic regulatory laws also demonstrates that there is a need for
tough civil and criminal penalties. If violations of market rules can go unpunished,
they will become more frequent. Again, the Federal Power Act comes up short. 19

Congress responded in 2005 by enacting the Energy Policy Act of 2005, or
the EP Act. 20 In “the most significant increase in Commission regulatory authority
in 70 years,” 21 the EP Act gave FERC new explicit anti-manipulation rulemaking
authority.
The EP Act amended both the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) and the Federal
Power Act (FPA), allowing the FERC to issue rules to prohibit and prevent
manipulation in “connection with the purchase or sale of natural gas . . . subject
to the jurisdiction of the [FERC].” Specifically, it amended NGA Section 4A to
18. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONCERTED ACTIONS NEEDED BY FERC TO CONFRONT CHALLENGES
THAT IMPEDE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT 5 (2002).
19. Joseph T. Kelliher, Market Manipulation, Market Power, and the Authority of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 26 ENERGY L.J. 1, 8–14 (2005).
20. Pub.L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
21. ANNUAL REPORT 2006, FERC 3 (2007).
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make it unlawful for “any entity” to “directly or indirectly” engage in manipulative
trading of natural gas. 22 Congress modeled FERC’s new authority on the authority
given to the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), stating
that the words “manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” should be given
the same interpretation “as those terms are used in section [10(b) of the 1934
Act].” 23 In addition to addressing market manipulation, the EP Act 2005 expanded
FERC’s civil penalty authority to deter anticompetitive behavior. 24 The EP Act
also increased the maximum civil penalty for market manipulation to $1 million
per day per violation in addition to disgorgement of unjust profits.
The new anti-manipulation statutes were not self-implementing, so FERC
was required to devise the “implementing provision[s] designed to prohibit
manipulation and fraud in the markets the Commission is charged with
regulating.” 25 Because Congress modeled the anti-manipulation statutes after
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act (Section 10(b)), FERC modeled its new regulations
after Rule 10b-5, 26 the SEC’s regulation implementing Section 10(b). The FERC
adopted a new anti-manipulation rule in Order No. 670. 27
This order made it unlawful for any entity to directly or indirectly (i) use or
employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud; (ii) make any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit any material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading; or (iii) engage in any act, practice or course of business that
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any entity in connection with
the purchase or sale of natural gas or electricity. The “any entity” and “in
connection with” language of Order No. 670 makes it relatively expansive. It
appears to give the FERC jurisdiction over entities not subject to FERC’s
traditional jurisdiction as long as that entity engages in conduct relating to a
FERC jurisdictional transaction.
The FERC has interpreted this rule to give it jurisdiction over traders whose
activities in the futures markets can impact or affect the prices charged in
regulated energy markets. This has pitted the FERC against the CFTC in
enforcement actions involving commodities futures contracts.

22.

The full text of Section 4A of the Natural Gas Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any entity, directly or indirectly, to use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of natural gas or the purchase or sale of transportation services subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance (as those terms are
used in section 78j(b) of this title) in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary in the public interest or for the protection of natural gas ratepayers. Nothing
in this section shall be construed to create a private right of action.

15 U.S.C. § 717c-1 (1938).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1 (1938); 16 U.S.C.S. § 824v (2006).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c-1, 717t-1 (1938); 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 824o-1, 824v (2006); see also Energy Policy Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005), 314, 315, 1283, 1284.
25. Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, Final Rule, Order No. 670 (“Order No. 670”), ¶ 5, 71
Fed. Reg. 4,244, 4,246 (Jan. 26, 2006); see also Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, ¶ 7, 70 Fed. Reg. 61,930, 61,931 (Oct. 27, 2005).
26. 7 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005). FERC also adopted Section 1c.2, which applies to “electric energy
market manipulation” instead of to “natural gas market manipulation.” 18 C.F.R. § 1c.2 (2006). The text of
Section 1c.2 is virtually identical to the text of Section 1c.1, with changes in the language to reflect the
difference in the two markets.
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C. The CFTC/FERC Memorandum of Understanding
After Congress vested the FERC with anti-manipulation enforcement
power in the EP Act, it quickly appeared to many that the jurisdictional
boundaries of the CFTC and the FERC might overlap. In order to facilitate
cooperation between the CFTC and the FERC, the EP Act, as codified in Section
23 of the NGA, specifically directed the FERC and the CFTC to enter into a
memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) “relating to information sharing, which
shall include, among other things, provisions ensuring that information requests
to markets within the respective jurisdictions of each agency are properly
coordinated to minimize duplicative information requests, and provisions
regarding the treatment of proprietary trading information.” 28 Section 23 also
included a savings clause providing that “nothing in this section may be construed
to limit or affect the exclusive jurisdiction of the [CFTC].”
In 2005, the FERC and the CFTC entered into the MOU, 29 which provides
for each agency to request information from one another and states that each
agency will “coordinate on a regular basis oversight, investigative and
enforcement activities of mutual interest.” However, conspicuously absent was
any decision regarding the potentially overlapping anti-manipulation jurisdictions
of the CFTC and the FERC.
D. Jurisdictional Tussles Between the CFTC and the FERC
Since passage of the EP Act, the FERC has pursued a number of
investigations involving cross-market manipulation of natural gas or electricity
markets where companies have manipulated either the financial or physical
market in order to realize gains in the other. For example, in 2007, the FERC
alleged that Energy Transfer Partners (“ETP”) attempted to manipulate the price
of natural gas for delivery by selling massive quantities of natural gas contracts
on the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) and reporting those transactions to
Inside FERC Gas Market Reports. By doing this, ETP was attempting to
manipulate the index price of natural gas, and to benefit from this manipulation
with its financial basis swap positions tied to the Inside FERC natural gas index
prices. The FERC has accused Barclays Bank, Constellation Energy Commodities
Group, and BP of similar manipulation of physical commodity pricing to benefit
its swap positions. 30 On July 16, 2013 the FERC issued an order assessing $435
million in penalties against Barclays. 31 On July 30, 2013, the FERC entered into
a settlement agreement with JP Morgan in which JP Morgan agreed to pay $285
million in civil penalties and to disgorge $125 million in profits resulting from
alleged market manipulation. 32 Finally, on August 5, 2013, the FERC issued an

28. Energy Policy Act of 2005, § 316, 15 U.S.C. § 717t-2(c)).
29. Memorandum from FERC and CFTC Regarding Information Sharing and Treatment of Proprietary
Trading and Other Information (Oct. 15, 2005).
30. Constellation Energy Commodities Group, Inc., 138 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,168 (2012); Barclays Bank PLC,
Daniel Brin, Scott Connelly, Karen Levine, and Ryan Smith, 141 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,084 (2012).
31. Barclays Bank, PLC et al., 144 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,041 (2013).
32. In re Make-Whole Payments & Related Bidding Strategies, 144 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,068 (2013).
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Order proposing to fine BP nearly $29 million in penalties for allegedly
manipulating the natural gas market at the Houston Ship Channel. 33
Given the confusion regarding the boundaries between the CFTC and the
FERC, both pressured Congress to provide some clarity when it passed the DoddFrank Act. However, as discussed below, the Dodd-Frank Act further confused the
jurisdictional issue. 34
E. The Dodd-Frank Act
The Dodd-Frank Act provides that nothing in the CEA limits or affects any
statutory authority of FERC with respect to an agreement, contract, or transaction
that is (i) not executed, traded, or cleared on a registered entity or trading facility
and (ii) entered into pursuant to a tariff or rate schedule approved by FERC. 35
The Dodd-Frank Act also mandated that, within 180 days after enactment
of the law, the CFTC and FERC were required to negotiate a MOU to establish
procedures for:
•
•
•

applying their respective authorities in a manner that ensures effective
and efficient regulation in the public interest;
resolving conflicts concerning overlapping jurisdiction between the two
agencies; and
avoiding, to the extent possible, conflicting or duplicative regulation.

The Dodd-Frank Act further provides that nothing in the Act limits or
affects any statutory enforcement authority of FERC under the provisions of the
Federal Power Act or the Natural Gas Act that existed prior to enactment of the
Act. To date, the agencies have not entered into the required MOU.
IV. Hunter v. FERC
A. Procedural History

1. CFTC Action
On July 25, 2007, the CFTC filed an enforcement proceeding against
Amaranth and Hunter in the Southern District of New York, alleging that they
attempted to manipulate the natural gas market on NYMEX by “hammering the
close.” 36
Hunter’s conduct pre-dated the CFTC’s fraud-based anti-manipulation rule
promulgated under the Dodd-Frank Act and was instead prosecuted under an
anti-manipulation rule that required the creation of an artificial price. Because
the CFTC has historically had difficulty proving an artificial price, the CFTC’s
33.
34.

BP Am., Inc., et al., 144 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,100 (2013).
See Terence T. Healey, Joseph B. Williams, & Paul J. Pantano, Jr., Energy Commodities: The
Netherworld Between FERC and CFTC Jurisdiction, 33 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1 (2003).
35. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 722(e), 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(I).
36. See CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., et al., No. ’07 CIV 6682 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 25, 2007); Press
Release, CFTC, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Charges Hedge Fund Amaranth and its
Former Head Energy Trader, Brian Hunter, with Attempted Manipulation of the Price of Natural Gas
Futures (July 25, 2007).
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complaint alleged that Amaranth and Hunter intentionally and unlawfully
attempted to manipulate the price of natural gas futures contracts on the NYMEX
on February 24, 2006 and April 26, 2006.
The date of February 24, 2006 represented the last day of trading (expiry
day) for the March 2006 NYMEX natural gas futures contract, and April 26, 2006
was the expiry day of the May 2006 NYMEX natural gas futures contract. The
settlement price of each NYMEX natural gas futures contract is determined by the
volume-weighted average of trades executed from 2:00–2:30 p.m. (the closing
range) on the expiry day of such contracts. The complaint alleges that, for each of
the expiry days at issue, the defendants acquired more than 3,000 NYMEX natural
gas futures contracts in advance of the closing range, which they planned to, and
generally did, sell during the closing range. 37 The complaint also alleges that the
defendants held large short natural gas financially settled swaps positions,
primarily held on the ICE. The settlement price of the ICE swaps is based on the
NYMEX natural gas futures settlement price determined by trading done during
the closing range on expiry day. According to the complaint, the defendants
intended to lower the prices of the NYMEX natural gas futures contracts to benefit
the defendants’ larger swaps positions on ICE. The complaint also alleges that in
response to an inquiry from NYMEX about the April 26, 2006 trading, Amaranth
made false statements to NYMEX to cover up the defendants’ attempted
manipulation. 38
On August 12, 2009, the CFTC entered into a consent order settling charges
brought against Amaranth Advisors and its Amaranth Advisors (Calgary)
subsidiary for attempting to manipulate the price of natural gas futures contracts
on the NYMEX on February 24 and April 26, 2006. 39 The Order requires that the
Amaranth entities pay a $7.5 million civil monetary penalty. It also permanently
enjoins the Amaranth entities from violating the anti-manipulation provisions of
the CEA, and prohibits Amaranth Advisors from violating CEA Section 9(a)(4),
which prohibits anyone from making false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements to
registered entities, such as the NYMEX. The consent order arises from the CFTC’s
complaint filed on July 25, 2007. 40

2. FERC Action
On July 26, 2007—one day after the CFTC filed its complaint—the FERC
issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Proposed Penalties against
Amaranth, Hunter, and Matthew Donohoe, based on a preliminary determination
that Amaranth and former traders manipulated natural gas markets through
trading on the NYMEX Natural Gas Futures Contract (“Show Cause Order”). 41
Because the elements of the FERC anti-manipulation rule did not require a
showing of an artificial price, the FERC did not follow the CFTC’s lead by alleging
“attempted” manipulation. The FERC also alleged that Hunter’s manipulation
37. See CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., et al., No. ’07 CIV 6682 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 25, 2007).
38. See id.
39. See CFTC Press Release, Amaranth Entities Ordered to Pay a $7.5 Million Civil Fine in CFTC Action
Alleging Attempted Manipulation of Natural Gas Futures Prices, Release 5692-09 (Aug. 12, 2009).
40. See CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., et al., 07-cv-6682 (DC) (S.D.N.Y.); CFTC Press Release
5359-07 (July 25, 2007).
41. Amaranth Advisors L.L.C. et al., 120 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,085 (July 26, 2007).
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occurred on the expiry day of three consecutive months in 2006, whereas the
CFTC’s action alleged manipulation only on February 24, 2006 (for the March
contract) and April 26, 2006 (for the May contract). The FERC sought $232 million
in civil penalties against the named parties and the disgorgement of $59 million
plus interest in unjust profits from Amaranth. 42
Although the alleged manipulation took place across two different
markets—the futures markets and the over-the-counter (OTC) markets—neither
of which are regulated by the FERC, the agency nevertheless claimed that it had
a jurisdictional stake because the defendants conduct “affected” the interests of a
third market—the wholesale natural gas market, over which FERC clearly does
have jurisdiction. 43 Thus, in the Show Cause Order, the FERC concludes that
“[t]his case concerns the important nexus between the wholesale interstate
natural gas markets subject to our jurisdiction and the New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX) Natural Gas Futures Contract (the NG Futures Contract).” 44
In the Show Cause Order, the FERC alleges that Amaranth manipulated
the “settlement” price of the Natural Gas Futures Contract on February 24, March
29 and April 26, 2006, by selling an “extraordinary” amount of contracts during
the last thirty minutes of trading before the contracts expired. 45 These actions
allegedly drove the settlement price down, thereby benefiting Amaranth’s
positions in financially-settled swaps and options, which were primarily traded on
the ICE. Amaranth’s position in these derivatives was significantly larger than its
position in the NYMEX contracts, and the value of these derivatives on ICE
increased as a result of the decrease in the settlement price of these contracts.
On July 17, 2008, the FERC issued a ruling on several issues in its ongoing
investigation of whether Amaranth, Hunter, and Donohoe violated the FERC’s
anti-manipulation rules. 46 First, the FERC reaffirmed its view that it has
jurisdiction to impose penalties for manipulative trading of certain NYMEX
natural gas futures contracts that had an effect on physical natural gas sales
prices. Second, the FERC exercised personal jurisdiction over Hunter and
Amaranth International Limited, an affiliate of Amaranth. Third, the FERC ruled
that liability can be triggered when an entity, including individuals, acts with
reckless disregard to physical natural gas prices subject to the FERC’s jurisdiction,
even if such conduct does not include the provision of false information. Fourth,
the FERC ruled that parties may not seek de novo review in federal district court
until FERC has first assessed penalties under the Natural Gas Act for violations
of its market manipulation regulations. 47
On November 25, 2008, FERC staff agreed to settle the matter with
Amaranth, Hunter, and Donohoe, but FERC rejected the settlement offer on
February 12, 2009. 48 FERC stated:
[T]he Commission estimated that Amaranth profited far in excess of the proposed
settlement amounts as a direct result of alleged manipulation of NYMEX NG
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2; see also FERC, Fact Sheet re Amaranth, FERC Docket No. IN0726-00 (July 26, 2007).
45. Id.
46. Amaranth Advisors LLC, 124 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,050 (2008).
47. The FERC ordered an administrative law judge to hold a hearing to resolve the material facts in
dispute on these matters.
48. See Amaranth Advisors LLC, Order Rejecting Settlement, 126 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,112.
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Futures Contract prices that recklessly affected the price of physical natural gas
subject to Commission jurisdiction. Having considered the gravity of the alleged
violations, the potential remedies for those violations if proven to have occurred,
and the remedies offered in the Settlement, the Commission concludes that the
settlement is not in the public interest and hereby rejects it. 49

On August 12, 2009, FERC settled its anti-manipulation case against
Amaranth Advisors, several of its affiliates, and Matthew Donohoe. 50 Under the
settlement, Matthew Donohoe and the Amaranth parties stipulated to facts
regarding their positions in the natural gas futures contracts, sales of those
contracts and positions in derivative swaps.
The parties also stipulated that FERC “properly raised questions about the
effects of futures contracts trading on prices in the physical natural gas market
because the trading at issue appeared atypical, anomalous and unusual, and
therefore had the potential to erode public confidence in the validity of the
settlement price.” 51 Further, the settlement provides that the Amaranth parties
“concede FERC’s subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding.” 52
Notably, however, January 22, 2010 marks the first time that FERC found
that a futures trader violated the agency’s anti-manipulation rule. 53 A FERC
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that Hunter “intentionally manipulated
the settlement price of the at-issue natural gas futures contracts. His trading was
specifically designed to lower the NYMEX price in order to benefit his swap
positions on other exchanges.” 54
With respect to Hunter’s fraudulent and deceptive behavior, the ALJ found
that Hunter’s trading of a significant volume of natural gas futures contracts
during the final settlement periods in March, April and May 2006 constituted
fraudulent behavior. 55 According to the ALJ:
The evidence in this case compels the conclusion that Hunter had the incentive to
lower the price to benefit his other positions in other trading platforms.
Additionally, he took the actions necessary to effectuate his scheme. He traded
significant volume (a condition necessary for and consistent with a manipulation
scheme) in the closing period. His traders hit bids, which almost guarantees a
lower price (again consistent with a manipulation scheme), and generally traded
at prices below those of other traders. He acquired significant positions in the other
platforms which would profit from his lowering the price on NYMEX. 56

In finding that Hunter acted with scienter, the ALJ stated that Hunter’s
trading was specifically designed to lower the NYMEX price in order to benefit his
swap positions on other exchanges, and he knew that his NYMEX equivalent
positions on other exchanges would benefit from a lower NYMEX settlement
price. 57
49. Id.
50. See 128 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,154 (2009); FERC approves $7.5 million civil penalty in Amaranth Case, News
Release, Docket No. IN07-26-000 (August 12, 2009).
51. Id.; 128 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,154 at 10–11.
52. Id.
53. 130 F.E.R.C. ¶ 63,004.
54. Id. at ¶ 143.
55. Id. at ¶ 84.
56. Id.
57. Id. at ¶ 143.
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Finally, the ALJ noted that futures contracts bought and sold on NYMEX
were “related to natural gas transactions.” 58 In making this finding, the ALJ relied
upon the fact that some NYMEX natural gas futures contracts become physical
delivery obligations, and the notion that a trader “entering the futures market
during times of manipulation with the intention to go to delivery is clearly affected
by the manipulation.” 59 Moreover, according to the ALJ, the NYMEX settlement
price also affects physical basis contract prices and “indirectly” affects index-based
contracts. 60
On April 21, 2011, FERC affirmed the ALJ’s initial decision and found that
Hunter’s trading of NYMEX natural gas futures contracts in 2006 violated FERC’s
anti-manipulation rule. 61 FERC issued an order imposing a $30 million civil
penalty on Hunter.
In its decision, FERC noted that “Hunter’s trading practices during the atissue expiration days [in Spring 2006] were fraudulent or deceptive, undertaken
with the requisite scienter, and carried out in connection with FERC-jurisdictional
natural gas transactions.” 62 FERC concluded that his trading was “specifically
intended to lower the settlement price” of natural gas futures contracts in order to
benefit his financially-settled natural gas swap positions on other trading
platforms, and that Hunter acted “with reckless disregard as to the impact of his
conduct upon the physical market for natural gas.” 63 Hunter appealed this
decision to the D.C. Circuit.
B. The Appeal

1. The Petitioner—Brian Hunter
In an effort to avoid paying the $30 million fine FERC had saddled him
with, Hunter appealed the FERC’s decision on the grounds that FERC did not
have jurisdiction to fine him. Hunter’s appeal to the court centered on two key
arguments. 64 First, Hunter argued that FERC did not have jurisdiction over
Hunter’s actions because the CFTC had exclusive jurisdiction. He pointed out that
FERC has never denied that all of his alleged manipulative activities occurred in
the natural gas futures contract market—a market only the CFTC had jurisdiction
to regulate. Hunter argued that CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A) gave the CFTC exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the commodities futures market, leaving FERC without
authority in this arena.
Hunter’s second argument dealt with FERC’s interpretation of the NGA
language itself. Hunter contested FERC’s expansive interpretation of the phrase
“any entity.” He argued that the NGA’s “any entity” applied only to “physical
market participants,” such as municipalities. He maintained that applying the
“any entity” language to individuals impermissibly extended the scope of the
NGA’s anti-manipulation prohibition.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at ¶ 206.
Id. at ¶ 207.
Id. at ¶ 207.
Hunter, 135 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,054 (2011).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 32.

Brief for the Petitioner, Hunter, v. FERC, 2012 WL 1202702 (C.A.D.C. Apr. 10, 2012).
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2. The Respondent—FERC
In response, FERC acknowledged the CFTC’s jurisdiction over swaps or
futures that Hunter traded in, but countered that the CFTC’s jurisdiction was not
exclusive over manipulation. 65 FERC argued that Section 4A of the NGA instead
gave it complementary jurisdiction to prohibit manipulation, relying on the same
broad “any entity” and “in connection with” language of the EP Act that Hunter
argued should not apply to him. FERC took this argument a step further and
suggested that, while the CEA gave the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over the dayto-day regulation of its financial markets, it did not extend exclusive jurisdiction
to manipulation. Instead, when an over-arching scheme of manipulation directly
or indirectly affected another market, both agencies should have an enforcement
role.
To further support its argument that Congress had intended
complementary jurisdiction over manipulation, the FERC pointed to NGA Section
23, requiring that the CFTC and FERC execute an MOU to coordinate their antimanipulation efforts. FERC cited to language in the MOU stating that the CFTC
and FERC may from time to time “engage in oversight or investigations of activity
affecting both CFTC jurisdictional and FERC jurisdictional markets.”
Furthermore, FERC noted that Congress had specifically declined to apply Section
23’s savings clause to the entire Act. It argued that these statutory provisions
supported its argument that the CFTC did not have exclusive jurisdiction over
manipulation of commodities futures contracts. Therefore, there was no
irreconcilable conflict between the CEA and the EP Act, and both should be given
their effect.

3. The Intervenor—CFTC
In a rare move, the CFTC decided to join the fray in an effort to protect its
jurisdiction. On November 3, 2003, the CFTC filed a brief as an intervenor in the
case. 66 In its brief, the CFTC generally mirrored Hunter’s argument that the
CFTC, and only the CFTC, has jurisdiction over the natural gas futures market.
The CFTC also cited to CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A) to implore the court to decide that
this statutory language granted it exclusive jurisdiction over futures trading.
In intervening in this action, it is likely the CFTC was hoping the court
would settle the jurisdictional question once and for all. On March 15, 2013, the
court reached a decision that will undoubtedly have an immense impact on all of
the parties involved, and market participants generally.
C. The Decision
In its opinion, 67 the D.C. Circuit Court quickly determined that FERC’s
jurisdiction over the enforcement action turned on the answers to two questions:

65. Brief for the Respondent, Hunter v. FERC, 2010 WL 5779121 (C.A.D.C. Sep. 16, 2010).
66. Brief for the Intervenor–Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Hunter v. FERC, 2008 WL
4960214 (C.A.D.C. Nov. 3, 2008).
67. Hunter v. FERC, 11-1477, 2013 WL 1003666 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 2013).
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As we see it, this case reduces to two questions. First, does CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A)
encompass manipulation of natural gas futures contracts? If yes, then we need to
answer the second question: did Congress clearly and manifestly intend to
impliedly repeal CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A) when it enacted the Energy Policy Act of
2005? 68

To answer the first question, the court looked to the language of CEA
Section 2(a)(1)(A).
A quick glance at the statute’s text answers the first question. CEA Section
2(a)(1)(A) vests the CFTC with “exclusive jurisdiction . . . with respect to accounts,
agreements[,] . . . and transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for
future delivery, traded or executed” on a CFTC-regulated exchange. Here, FERC
fined Hunter for trading natural gas futures contracts with the intent to
manipulate the price of natural gas in another market. Hunter's scheme, therefore,
involved transactions of a commodity futures contract. By CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A)’s
plain terms, the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the manipulation of natural
gas futures contracts. 69

The court reasoned that, if it read the language to mean FERC had
overlapping jurisdiction over manipulation, as FERC argued it should, the CFTC’s
exclusive regulation over futures contracts would be decimated. It believed this
went against Congress’s clear goal of centralizing oversight of futures contracts in
the CFTC. For these reasons, the court answered the first question in the
affirmative, stating that “if a scheme, such as manipulation, involves buying or
selling commodity futures contracts, CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A) vests the CFTC with
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other agencies.” 70
Because the CEA gave the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over futures
contracts, the court next recognized that, in order for the EP Act to award the
FERC jurisdiction over the action, the EP Act must impliedly repeal CEA Section
2(a)(1)(A). The court noted that “repeals by implication will not be found unless an
intent to repeal is clear and manifest.” 71 The court made it clear that it would not
infer that one statute partly repealed another unless the later statute expressly
contradicted the original act and there existed clear and manifest Congressional
intent to repeal the original statute.
First, the court was not persuaded that the text of Section 4A of the NGA
contradicted CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A) in a way that would allow the FERC’s
anti-manipulation jurisdiction to infringe on the CEA’s exclusive jurisdiction.
Because the FERC was free to prohibit manipulative trading in other markets
outside the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction, the court did not believe the statutory
provisions were irreconcilable.
The court was also unpersuaded that Section 23’s savings clause and MOU
mandate contradicted the CEA. It found that Section 23 did not unambiguously
grant the FERC complementary or parallel jurisdiction over futures contracts.
Section 23 is far more ambiguous than FERC admits. By requiring the two
agencies to enter into a memorandum of understanding to “ensur[e] that
information requests to markets within the respective jurisdiction of each agency
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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are properly coordinated,” Section 23 indicates that the CFTC and FERC regulate
separate markets. 72

Given that ambiguity, the court did not believe Congress’s failure to include
a universal savings clause in the NGA constituted clear and manifest intent to
impliedly repeal the CEA. Because the court found neither clear congressional
intent to repeal the CEA nor an irreconcilable contradiction between the statutes,
it held that the EP Act did not impliedly repeal CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A).
Because the CFTC had exclusive jurisdiction over natural gas futures
contracts and the NGA did not implicitly repeal the CEA, the court ruled the FERC
did not have jurisdiction to fine Hunter.
V. Implications of the D.C. Circuit Court’s Opinion in Hunter v. FERC
A. FERC’s Decision Not to Appeal the D.C. Circuit Opinion
In a press briefing 73 following the D.C. Circuit Court’s opinion, FERC
Chairman Wellinghoff declared that the FERC would not appeal the court’s
jurisdictional ruling. The Chairman expressed his belief that the decision was
narrowly focused on gas futures transactions and would not affect any pending
manipulation actions involving products administered by regional transmission
organizations. During the briefing, Wellinghoff hinted at a legislative solution to
eliminate holes that might compromise FERC’s “ability to prevent fraud and
manipulation in both the gas and electric markets.” But thus far, the Senate has
merely punted back to the agencies, urging the two to work together on the
problem.
On April 29, 2013, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), chairman of the
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee, and Senators Ron
Wyden (D-Ore.) and Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska), chairman and ranking member
of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, sent a letter to the CFTC and
FERC Chairmen urging the agencies to execute the statutorily mandated MOUs
in compliance with Section 720 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Commenting that “[r]ecent
disputes over the jurisdiction of each Commission to punish wrongdoing in these
markets have undermined efforts to monitor energy commodity trading,” the
Senators called upon the agencies to “cooperate in order to protect American
consumers.”
B. Clarity or Confusion?
In the absence of a legislative solution, Chairman Wellinghoff may have
been overly confident in his assessment of the limited scope of the D.C. Circuit
Court’s opinion, particularly in light of recent changes to the CEA after the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. The D.C. Circuit’s decision clarified for market
participants and regulators that FERC cannot prosecute actors for manipulating
a CFTC futures contract to benefit a related swaps position even if the transaction
may affect a physical, FERC jurisdictional transaction. Less clear is whether
72.
73.

Id. at 5.
See PLATTS MEGAWATT DAILY, Apr. 4, 2013, at 1, 18.
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FERC retains its anti-manipulation authority over an actor’s cross-market
manipulative scheme that involves both a FERC-jurisdictional transaction and a
CFTC-jurisdictional transaction. The D.C. Circuit suggests that FERC may not
retain jurisdiction in the latter instance: “if a scheme, such as manipulation,
involves buying or selling commodity futures contracts, CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A)
vests the CFTC with jurisdiction to the exclusion of other agencies.” 74 The
boundaries of the CFTC/FERC jurisdictional constraints are further complicated
and blurred under the CFTC’s expanded jurisdiction over swap transactions, as
discussed below.
C. The CFTC’s Jurisdiction Over Swap Transactions
The D.C. Circuit Court relied on the exclusive jurisdiction provision of CEA
Section 2(a)(1)(A) to state that, “if a scheme, such as manipulation, involves buying
or selling commodity futures contracts, CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A) vests the CFTC
with jurisdiction to the exclusion of other agencies.” 75 As amended by the DoddFrank Act, the CEA now vests the CFTC with exclusive jurisdiction over
“transactions involving swaps or contracts for sale of a commodity for future
delivery . . . traded or executed on . . . a swap execution facility . . . or any other
board of trade, exchange, or market, and transactions subject to regulation by the
Commission pursuant to section 23 of this title.” 76
Under the D.C. Circuit Court’s analysis, a manipulative scheme in the
energy markets involving a swap transaction could thus fall within the
jurisdictional reach of the CFTC to the exclusion of the FERC. Nonetheless, FERC
can find some comfort in the CEA’s savings clause, which provides that the CEA
does not limit or affect the statutory authority of the FERC with respect to any
contract that is not executed, traded, or cleared on a registered entity or trading
facility or entered into pursuant to a tariff or rate schedule. 77 However, in recent
rulemakings, the CFTC has been careful to preserve its anti-manipulation
authority over swap transactions even where it has granted other exemptions.
On March 28, 2013, the CFTC issued a final order exempting energy-related
transactions offered or sold in ISO/RTO markets from the requirements of CEA
with the exception of the CFTC’s anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority. 78
The CFTC’s final order exempts four classes of ISO/RTO transactions from the
CFTC’s requirements under Dodd-Frank, including: (i) financial transmission
rights; (ii) energy transactions in day-ahead and real time markets; (iii) forward
capacity transactions; and (iv) reserve or regulation transactions. The
transactions will qualify for exemptive relief if they are entered into between
eligible parties pursuant to tariffs, rate schedules or protocols approved by FERC

74. Hunter, 2013 WL 1003666 at 3 (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (1936) (emphasis added).
77. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(I) (1936).
78. Final Order in Response to a Petition From Certain Independent System Operators and Regional
Transmission Organizations to Exempt Specified Transactions Authorized by a Tariff or Protocol Approved
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or the Public Utility Commission of Texas From Certain
Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act Pursuant to the Authority Provided in the Act, 78 FR 19879 (Apr.
2, 2013).
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or, in the case of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, the Public Utility
Commission of Texas.
VI. Conclusion
The CFTC’s anti-manipulation authority over RTO transactions presents a
potential reprise of the turf war at issue in Hunter v. FERC. FERC unsuccessfully
attempted to head off this tussle in responsive comments to the CFTC’s proposed
RTO exemption by arguing that the exemption was unnecessary because energy
transactions in RTO markets do not constitute swaps in the first instance. 79
However, the CFTC’s final order fell short of proclaiming that financial energy
transactions in ISOs/RTOs would not qualify under the definition of a swap. To
the contrary, the CFTC ensured that it would have a jurisdictional card to play in
the event of manipulative conduct in RTO markets by preserving its antimanipulation authority. While this jurisdictional card may not trump FERC’s
authority due to the savings clause in CEA Section 2(a)(1)(I), future tussles
between the agencies appear inevitable in the absence of a meaningful MOU or a
legislative solution.

79. Comments of the Staff of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in response to CFTC’s proposed
order on Petition of Independent System Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations for Specified
Transactions from Certain Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, Sep. 27, 2012.
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